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How to road price in a world with electric 
vehicles and government budget constraints 
Paal Brevik Wangsness1  
Institute of Transport Economics – Norwegian Centre for Transport Research, 
Gaustadaleen 21, 0349 Oslo, Norway 
 
Abstract: In this paper we examine what characterizes second-best road prices 
targeting external costs from driving electric (EV) and conventional (ICEV) vehicles 
when there are distortionary labor taxes and binding government budget constraints. 
Further, we examine how this second-best pricing fits with government set goals of 
reducing CO2 emissions. The paper further develops an analytical framework for 
assessing first- and second-best road prices on vehicle kilometers, extending it to 
include EVs and externalities that vary geographically and by time of day. We find 
that optimal road prices largely vary with external cost, but are also significantly 
affected by the interactions with the rest of the fiscal system. Not surprisingly, the 
highest road prices should be for ICEVs in large cities during peak hours due to high 
external costs. More surprisingly, we find that the road price for ICEVs in rural areas 
should be lower than that for EVs due to large fiscal interaction effects. These road 
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prices give large welfare gains, but they lead to no reduction in carbon emissions 
when applying the currently recommended social cost of carbon.  
 
Keywords: Road pricing; Road transport externalities; Electric vehicles; Government 
budget constraints; Tax interaction; CO2 emission constraints 
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1 Introduction 
The road transport market is associated with market imperfections such as local and 
global pollution, accidents, noise and road wear. Thune-Larsen et al. (2014) calculate 
external costs in Norway of up to NOK 30 billion (Norwegian kroner; 1 NOK = 
€0.11 = $0.13) per year from road transport – a figure that does not include CO2 
costs, even though road transport in 2015 accounted for 19% of Norway’s 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Ministry of Finance, 2017). In addition to 
externalities from road transport, inefficiencies in the economy arise from 
distortionary taxes elsewhere. Externalities and inefficiencies in the tax system have 
recently come under renewed scrutiny with government-assigned expert committees 
publishing so-called Norwegian Official Reports (Norges Offentlige Utredinger – 
NOU), with NOU 2014:13 – Capital Taxation in an International Economy and NOU 
2105:15 – Green Tax Commission. Looking for ways by which to mitigate these 
inefficiencies is in itself motivation for this paper. 
As recommended by many transport economists before us, we propose a road 
pricing scheme for mitigating these inefficiencies. More specifically, we propose 
distance-based road pricing, differentiated across vehicle types and pre-defined areas 
and time periods according to their external costs, also factoring in revenue recycling 
through labor taxation. 
We raise the following research questions: What characterizes the set of second-best 
road prices targeting external costs from driving EVs and ICEVs when there are 
distortionary labor taxes and binding government budget constraints? How are these 
prices affected by tax distortions in the labor, electricity and car ownership market? 
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How does this second-best pricing fit with government set goals of reducing CO2 
emissions? 
Our paper makes the following contributions: First, it extends an established 
modeling framework for optimal taxation in transport with revenue recycling of 
distortionary labor taxes to include a) different areas and time periods where external 
costs vary, and b) both ICEVs and EVs and their associated taxes. This allows us to 
take a broad view how a national road pricing scheme optimally would look like. As 
road prices per combination of vehicle type, area and time period, and the labor tax 
rate are determined simultaneously, this model also allows us to see the endogeneity 
of how changes in one road price affects the levels of the others. This can result in 
road prices that differ from traditional Pigovian solutions in several dimensions. We 
can also see how costs and benefits of the scheme are distributed geographically. 
Second, it provides numerical results for the case of Norway, a country where the 
Ministry of Transport has started investigating the possibilities for distance-based 
road pricing applying satellite technology. It is also the country with the highest EV 
share of the car fleet in the world, strengthening both fiscal and externality 
arguments for moving from fuel tax to a more sophisticated way of road pricing. 
Our paper is constructed as follows. In section 2 we provide some background and 
literature review. In section 3 we introduce the analytical framework and derive 
expressions for optimal road prices. The numerical modeling with parameter values 
and scenarios is explained in Section 4, while the results from the modeling exercise 
are given in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
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2 Background and literature 
In order to strike the appropriate balance between costs and benefits in the affected 
markets, the “textbook economics” solution would be to find a set of taxes that 
provide the incentives for economic agents to do so. The optimal gasoline (or diesel) 
tax is given as one solution in several papers; for instance, in the cases of the UK and 
USA (Parry & Small, 2005), and Germany (Tscharaktschiew, 2014, 2015).  
However, there are shortcomings to correcting road transport market failures 
through fuel taxation. First, the external costs of driving vary depending on where 
and when it takes place, making a fuel tax an imprecise instrument. In addition, a fuel 
tax provides incentives for more energy efficiency, which could be beneficial with 
regard to carbon emissions and oil reliance, but lead to higher external costs because 
lower user costs per kilometer would induce more driving. This has been pointed out 
in several papers (see e.g., Parry, Evans, & Oates, 2014; Parry & Small, 2005; Proost, 
Delhaye, Nijs, & Van Regemorter, 2009). 
Second, the possibility for fuel taxes to (imprecisely) correct for externalities and 
generate government revenue is reduced when EVs (electric vehicles)2 are 
introduced. EVs have many of the same externalities as ICEVs (internal combustion 
engine vehicles), but they cannot be captured by a gas tax and it seems implausible 
they can be taxed explicitly from electricity use.  
                                                 
2 In this paper, when we refer to electric vehicles (EVs) we consistently mean pure battery electric 
vehicles (BEVs), without any hybrid technology. 
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So, are there better ways of taxing, ways that internalize external cost more precisely 
and allow for the taxation of all cars? This brings us into the discussion of road 
pricing. A vast literature on road pricing has accumulated over the decades. Button 
and Verhoef (1998, p. 4) refer to Pigou (1920) and Knight (1924) as the spiritual 
fathers of road pricing. Since then, hundreds of theoretical and empirical papers on a 
wide variety of road pricing schemes have been published, making it useful to specify 
exactly what kind of road pricing this article will focus on. Levinson (2010) 
developed a typology with 90 types of road pricing, organizing it along the three 
dimensions; the spatial resolution, the temporal resolution and the pricing objective. 
Within the dimensions of this typology, this article focuses on area based3, time-
varying, second-best road pricing.  
We focus on this specific type of road pricing because we believe it has a potential to 
generate large efficiency improvements for a country like Norway. Support for the 
merits of the distance-based aspects can be found in the literature. Analysis from 
Parry and Small (2005) and from May and Milne (2004) shows that distance-based 
road pricing can generate greater social benefits than, for example, fuel taxation and 
cordon-tolling. Furthermore, modeling analysis from Meurs, Haaijer, and Geurs 
(2013) suggests that distance-based road pricing using satellite technology can be 
beneficial for the Netherlands compared to the current tax system for car-use and 
car-ownership. Small and Verhoef (2007) along with André de Palma and Lindsey 
(2011) argue for the potential for high economic efficiency of distance-based road 
pricing, and note that GPS technology is suitable for a scheme like this. The latter 
                                                 
3 More specifically, distance-based road pricing that vary by a small number of areas; large city, small 
city and rural. 
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argue that a satellite-based road-pricing system has advantages with regards to scale 
economies and in the potential for value-added services and revenue generation.  
The technologies underlying satellite-based road pricing have matured over the last 
decades, meaning that the timing is good for research having this in mind. Such 
technology could in theory enable the theoretically best type of road pricing 
according to the typology from Levinson (2010); dynamic marginal cost pricing on 
differentiated links. However, both privacy concerns and the understandability of the 
system for the general public sets a limit on spatial and temporal granularity. It will 
probably not be permissible for the road pricing authority to monitor car users at the 
finest level of detail, and a large number of car users cannot be expected to 
understand a system with a wide variety of dynamically changing road prices. This 
makes distance-based prices differentiated across pre-defined areas and time periods 
a promising alternative. Finally, because of the new emphasis on reducing 
inefficiencies in the Norwegian tax system, we want to focus on second-best road 
prices as a part of a tax reform where revenues are recycled back into the economy 
through reduced distortionary labor taxes.  
Many of the aspects included in this specific form of road pricing have been covered 
in previous literature. The term road pricing has primarily been associated with road 
traffic congestion (Button & Verhoef, 1998, p. 6), and this has been the study of 
numerous papers. Over time, several papers have included environmental and/or 
accident externalities along with congestion (De Borger & Mayeres, 2007; De Borger 
& Wouters, 1998; André De Palma, Lindsey, & Quinet, 2004; Munk, 2008). Several 
papers have considered how road prices should differ across areas, e.g., between the 
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urban and the non-urban setting (Munk, 2008; Proost & Van Dender, 1998) or 
across the diesel and gasoline cars (De Borger & Mayeres, 2007), and an integrated 
transport and land-use model that can e.g., simulate the effects of distance-based 
road pricing differentiated by area and gasoline, diesel and electric cars is under 
development in the OECD (Tikoudis & Oueslati, 2017). Finally, many influential 
papers have considered road prices in interaction with other distortionary taxes (see 
e.g., De Borger, 2009; André De Palma & Lindsey, 2004; Mayeres & Proost, 1997; 
Munk, 2008; Parry & Bento, 2001; Parry & Small, 2005; Van Dender, 2003). 
We build on an analytical framework introduced by Parry and Small (2005), who 
applied it in deriving the optimal First-Best Pigou-Ramsey tax for gasoline in the UK 
and USA. This model was also used by Lin and Prince (2009) and by Antón-Sarabia 
and Hernández-Trillo (2014) in calculating the optimal gasoline tax in California and 
Mexico, respectively. A modified version is used in Parry (2009) and Tscharaktschiew 
(2015). Parry (2009) uses it to calculate optimal gasoline and diesel taxes, and 
Tscharaktschiew (2015) uses it to calculate optimal gasoline taxes in a model with 
both electric and diesel cars. It is a fairly simple model that generates insight and 
intuition. To a large extent, we build on the Tscharaktschiew (2015) version, which 
contains EV considerations. In this paper, we extend these model exercises in several 
dimensions in order to assess the optimal second-best tax for vehicle kilometers 
(hereafter, road prices). First, we analyze optimal road prices for both EVs and 
ICEVs and not just a single policy instrument such as gasoline tax. Second, we model 
how externalities vary geographically and by time of day, which gives us a set of 
second-best road prices that differ across four different stylized spatiotemporal 
states, large cities during peak hours, large cities off-peak, small cities and in rural 
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areas. Third, we apply the model to analyze the shadow price for reaching a (sector-
specific) GHG emissions reduction target at least cost. 
The Pigovian solution of setting the corrective tax equal to marginal external cost 
(MEC) is well known (see e.g., Perman, Ma, McGlivray, & Common, 2003). In this 
paper, we place ourselves in a second-best world with binding budget constraints and 
distortionary labor taxes, so we want to find second-best road prices. This is related 
to the debate on how to correctly assess optimal environmental taxation in the 
presence of distortionary taxation elsewhere in the economy (see e.g., Bovenberg, 
1999; Jacobs & de Mooij, 2015) and the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) (for a 
recent review, see Holtsmark & Bjertnæs, 2015). This literature shows that the 
debates on these topics are far from settled. We construct a model for analyzing 
optimal road prices in an economy with distortionary taxes ,and any analyst using it 
may choose to disallow MCF above 1, perhaps as part of a “moral sensitivity 
analysis” (see e.g., Mouter, 2016). The model can thus serve as a practical tool for 
analyzing the costs and benefits of road prices under varying assumptions. 
3 Analytical framework  
As explained above, we emphasize the importance of differentiating between 
spatiotemporal states, because the estimated value of the externalities varies between 
them. In order to avoid cumbersome notation, we attempt to solve the model for a 
single state containing all of the externalities, a state that can be thought of as a large 
city during peak hours. The numerical model calculates solutions for all of the states 
under consideration. 
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We make the simplifying assumption that agents and their cars are constrained to 
remain within one state only. Although this constraint is fairly strict, it should still 
cover the main purpose each agent has with her car.   
We consider a static, closed economy model with a representative household with 
the following utility function: 
(1) ( , , , , , , , )F F P PU u m v m v X l T E   
The utility function (.)u  considers goods in per household terms. It is quasi-concave 
and increasing in arguments Fm  and Pm , kilometers driven per car of type ICEV 
 F  and EV  P . It is also increasing in Fv  and Pv ; the number of cars per type4. 
This also applies for general consumption X , and leisure l . In contrast, utility is 
decreasing in arguments T , total in-vehicle travel time that, in addition to being an 
activity with some disutility (possibly), also reduces household utility through taking 
away time potentially used for working (and earning for consumption) and leisure. 
Utility is also decreasing inE , representing an index of environmental externalities. 
Total travel time for a household depends on aggregate vehicle kilometrage M in a 
particular area. We use bar notation to denote economy-wide variables perceived as 
exogenous by travelers. The total per-period travel time for a household is given by: 
(2) ( )iT t M M  
                                                 
4 We look at average ownership rates of vehicle types per household, treating it as a continuous 
variable. 
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The average travel time per kilometer  t M  is increasing in the aggregate vehicle 
kilometers travelled ( ' 0t  ) as higher economy-wide kilometrage leads to time delays 
due to congestion (in our stylized model we assume that such large traffic volumes in 
one area only occur in large cities during rush hours) and 
(3) 
P F P P F FM M M m v m v      
is the per-household distance traveled by car per period. 
Environmental externalities  ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )
F Pi F P M F M P
E E F E P E M E M  cover traffic 
externalities stemming from energy consumption FE and PE  (increasing in the use 
of fossil fuels and electricity, F and P ) and from vehicle kilometrage 
iM
E  
(increasing in iM  for each vehicle type i). The partial derivatives of E translate into 
marginal external damage (in units) from energy usage and kilometers traveled by car. 
We assume in this paper that there are no externalities associated with producing and 
consuming electricity for EVs, i.e., ( ) 0PE P  . In regard to GHGs, this assumption 
may hold for Norway, whose electricity generation consists overwhelmingly of hydro 
(95.8% hydro in 2015) (IEA, 2017). The argument is further strengthened by the fact 
that Norway is a part of the EU ETS market, as discussed in Bjertnæs (2016).  
In the household monetary budget constraint, expenditures related to car transport 
and other consumption are set equal to after-tax income in the following way: 
(4) 
 
 
( )
( ) (1 )
F
P
d
F F F m F F F
d
P P P m P P P X L
R f c m m c f v
R p c m m c p v P X wL

 
     
 
       
 
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Here, ( )i i iR r    denotes the consumer price per unit of energy type i. All 
consumer prices contain the pure fixed producer energy supply price ir  and the 
energy tax  i . Energy intensity for cars, expressed in units per kilometer, is denoted 
f for ICEVs and p  for EVs – lower energy intensity means higher energy 
efficiency. The terms d
Fc  and 
d
Pc  denote the other distance-dependent costs (repairs, 
service, etc.). We assume away any costs related to range anxiety or waiting time at 
charging stations for EVs5. Tolls are averaged to per-kilometer road prices (
Fm
 and 
Pm
 ). The terms ( )c f  and ( )c p  denote the other costs of owning a car, 
independently of distance. This would mainly be an annuity of the pre-tax purchase 
cost – costs assumed to depend on energy efficiency. These capture how increasing 
energy efficiency comes at a cost (otherwise everyone would choose the highest level 
of energy efficiency). As we will see later, the model agent has an elasticity of fuel 
efficiency and can thus respond to changes in consumer fuel costs by choosing 
higher or lower fuel intensity. i  represents the sum of the annual ownership tax 
and the annuity of the purchase tax for vehicle type. The cost of the general 
consumption goods basket is given by XP X .  
                                                 
5 A standard range of 190 km would be sufficient for most daily commuters that charge the car at 
home. According to Figenbaum (2018), there are about 1000 fast-chargers in Norway, amounting to 
one fast-charger per 140 BEV owners. The fast-chargers are mainly located in and around the cities, 
and along the highways between cities. In addition, there are about 7500 slow or semi-fast chargers 
that are public (and/or work place), making coverage adequate for most trip purposes in most parts of 
the country, but not all.  
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Net labor income per household is given by (1 )L wL , where L  is the tax rate on 
labor. Finally, w  represents hourly gross wage, while L  represents labor supply 
(total per-year working hours). Total pre-tax labor income is denoted as W .  
The relationship between fuel use, energy intensity and kilometers driven is given by: 
(5) F F FF f M fm v    
(6)  P P PP pM pm v   
Households also have a time constraint that can be written as follows: 
(7) ( )  L l t M M L   
Available time L is distributed between the activities labor, leisure and car travel. 
The government is subject to the following budget constraint, where fixed public 
spending GOV is set equal to net revenue from all taxes: 
(8) 
F PF P m F F m P P L P P F F
GOV F P m v m v wL v v            , 
We make the simplifying assumptions that general consumption goods are produced 
by firms under perfect competition and with constant returns to scale technology, 
where labor is the only production input. This means that the firms generate no pure 
economic profits and all producer prices are fixed. The gross wage for workers, w, 
equates the value of the marginal product of labor, which is assumed to be constant.  
Maximizing utility 
Households are assumed to maximize their utility function given in Eq. (1) with 
respect to the choice variables , , , , , ,F F P Pm v f m v p X and l . The optimization is 
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subject to Eq. (4) and Eq. (7), representing the monetary budget constraint and time 
constraint, respectively. Households treat travel times (affected by aggregate 
kilometrage), external environmental damages and all tax levels as given. We form 
the Lagrangian – where   is the Lagrange multiplier for the complete economic 
household budget constraint and can be interpreted as the marginal utility of income. 
We get first-order conditions from the optimization and use these to obtain the 
household’s indirect utility function, which yields maximized utility given prices, 
taxes and income, but also travel time and externalities determined by the aggregate 
level of driving.  
The households’ indirect utility function can be expressed by the following set of 
parameters  , , , , , , ,
F Pm m P F P L
t E       . These parameters (policy variables 
and time and environmental externalities) are, as previously mentioned, treated as 
given by the households. The government’s aim is to maximize the indirect utility 
function using the road pricing scheme policy variables. 
(9)
   
, , , , , , ,
( ) max ( , , , , , , , )
( ) ( )
(1 ) ( ( ) )
F F P P
F P
F F P P
m v f m v p X l
d d
F F F m F F F P P P m P P P
X L
V u m v m v X l T E
R f c m m c f v R p c m m c p v
P X w L l t M M
 


 
            
    
 
     
  
We show the analytical exercise of deriving the optimal tax on EV-km, 
Pm
 . 
Government revenues from 
Pm
 are recycled through reducing labor taxes, and all 
other transport and energy taxes are kept constant. All the steps of the analytical 
derivations are given in Appendix A. Here, in the main part of the paper, only the 
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most central equations are noted before we get to the analytical results. The analytical 
exercise starts with total differentiation of the household’s indirect utility function 
with respect to 
Pm
 . After some algebra and redefining of the externality terms we 
get the following expression for the marginal welfare effect of the kilometer tax: 
(10)
 
1
F P
P P P P P
c nc ncF P
F m m m
m m m m m
energy related externalities congestion externalities kilometrage related
non congestion externali
dM dMV dF dM
e e M e e
d d d d     

               
              
               
/
P F
P P P P
P P
ties
P F
m m F P
m m m m
km tax revenue energy tax revenue
P F
P F
m m
direct i
dM dM dF dP
d d d d
dv dv
D D
d d
   
   
 

                 
                 
                    
 
  /cos   
 
P
L
m
ndirect tax revenue t from labor tax revenue
vehicle stock
dW
d



  
Parameter 
Fe  represents the MEC stemming from the consumption of fossil fuel. 
We also have MEC of driving 1 km when contributing to congestion  cme M , which 
is increasing in traffic volumes. Similarly, parameters
F
nc
me , and P
nc
me  represent the 
environmental MEC from driving 1 kilometer from ICEVs and EVs, respectively 
(assumed to be constant within a given state). Parameters FD and PD represent the 
per vehicle annual tax revenue 
Fm F F F F
m fm    and 
Pm P P P P
m fm   . As 
we can see, the EV-km tax brings about a number of different changes in Eq. (10), 
which shows that the kilometer tax affects overall welfare through several channels. 
Deriving second-best road prices 
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We set the marginal welfare change (given by Eq. (10)) equal to zero and solve for 
Pm
 . This gives us the following expression:  
(11)
 *
1
P P P
P F P
P P P
F
P P P P P P P
m m F mc nc nc
m F m m m
P m P m P m
F P F
m F P P F L
m m m m m m P m
dF d dM d dM d
e e M e e
dM d dM d dM d
dM dv dvdF dP dW
D D
d d d d d d dM d
  

  
   
      
          
        
          
 
      
  
  
After more algebra, which is shown in Appendix A, we get the final expression for 
the optimal kilometer tax: 
(12) * ( )
P P P P P P P P P P
C I C RR TI C RR TI CF
m m m m m m m m m m                    
The first term is the corrective component: 
(13)    ( )
P P F
C nc c c nc
m m m F m m F Fe e M e M e e        . 
Parameters F  and F  are for how consumption of ICEV-kms and fossil fuel react 
to the EV-km tax. Note that in our second-best world we have to look at the total 
effect of the road price, and not simply equate the corrective tax to MEC. 
The second term in (12) is the revenue recycling component: 
(14) 
 
P
P L P
P
P P mRR
m m
M
R p c


 

  
   
 
 
. 
The term consists of the marginal cost of public funds, 
L
 , times the net tax 
revenue from marginally increasing the EV-km tax. The parameter 
PM
 is the own-
price elasticity of EV-kms. 
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The third term in (12) is the tax interaction component (excluding the congestion 
feedback component):  
(15)
 
 
  
( )
( )
1
1
P
P L F
P
d c
L P P m MI LITI
m F m F F P P P F F
M L
R p c
p D D
   
       
 
    
         
   
  
 
The fourth term is the congestion feedback component: 
(16)  
 
    1 (1 ) 1
1P L
CF c cL
m LI MI LL m F
L
e M

    

   

, 
The previously unmentioned parameters in these expressions are cMI and  MI , the 
compensated and uncompensated income elasticities for vehicle kilometers, LI , the 
income elasticity of labor supply, and cLL , the compensated elasticity of labor supply. 
L
  is the marginal cost of public funds (MCF), which has the following formula:  
(17) (1 )
(1 )
1
L
L L
L L
L L
L
L LL
L
L LL
w
W w

 
 
 
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 

 

 

  
 
  
This term reflects the marginal efficiency cost of raising public funds through taxing 
labor. On the flip side, it also reflects the marginal efficiency gain from cutting tax on 
labor, which could be done by, e.g., raising funds from road pricing. The numerator 
in this expression represents the efficiency cost from an incremental increase in labor 
taxation, while the denominator gives us the marginal change in public revenue.  
0LL   represents the elasticity of labor supply (uncompensated). We have 0L   
as a consequence of 0LL   and (1 )1
L
L LL

  . The latter implies that L  is not so 
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large that we find ourselves on the right side of the Laffer curve’s peak, meaning that 
government revenue from increasing labor taxation will, on the margin, be positive. 
Components of the optimal tax have been described thoroughly in Tscharaktschiew 
(2014, 2015), but here is a brief explanation. 
The corrective tax component addresses the external environmental damages from 
driving an EV-km. It includes the kilometer-related externalities in relation to 
congestion (same for all vehicles), and externalities such as pollution, noise and 
accident risk (differs between EVs and ICEVs). Note that the tax on EV-kms may 
induce more driving of ICEVs, which contributes to a reduction in the level of the 
corrective component. 
The revenue recycling component is the efficiency gain from using additional EV-km 
tax revenue to cut the distortionary labor tax and increase the efficiency of the tax 
system. The effect is equal to the marginal cost of public funds times the marginal 
net EV-km tax revenue gains due to the increase in EV-km taxation. 
The tax interaction component accounts for the efficiency loss in the labor market 
from the higher tax on kilometers. On the one hand, higher taxes reduce the real 
household wage and have a discouraging effect on labor supply. On the other, they 
include the income effect from a higher km-tax on labor supply. The other terms 
cover how the EV-km tax interacts with secondary markets, e.g., the electricity 
market, and the tax distortions there. 
The congestion feedback component accounts for how raising the cost of travel 
through road prices may reduce vehicle kilometers and congestion, and in that way 
affect labor supply through reductions in travel time. Workers may then allocate less 
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of their time on travel, and more of their time on either working or enjoying leisure 
activities. Since labor is subject to taxation, such a feedback effect would improve 
welfare and ceteris paribus cause upward adjustments to the second-best kilometer tax. 
When we present our numerical results, this is included in the tax interaction 
component where relevant, i.e. in the state large cities during peak hours. 
Functional relationships 
Parameters such as 
P
P
F m
F
P m
dM d
dM d



  quantify our assumptions on how households 
respond to changes in tax parameters. These parameters can be expressed in terms of 
elasticities, e.g., 
P
F
P
M
F M
F
P M
M
M



 , where P
F
M
M is the cross-price elasticity for ICEV-km, 
with respect to price change for EV-km. Furthermore, the direct response in per-
vehicle demand for vehicle-kms when the EV-km tax changes can be expressed 
through 
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, where we 
assume constant elasticity of demand. This is common in these kinds of analysis of 
optimal pricing in the transport sector, as can be seen in for example Parry and Small 
(2005), Parry (2009) and Tscharaktschiew (2014, 2015). We have similar expressions 
for responses in vehicle stock. The parameters 0
F
m  and 0
P
m  are the per-vehicle 
kilometrage in the initial equilibrium. The levels in the new equilibrium depend on 
the road prices in the new equilibrium. If, for example, *
Pm
  does not differ from 0
Pm
 , 
then there will be no change in the new equilibrium, as Pm  would equal 
0
P
m . 
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As we can see from the equations that comprise the optimal taxes, the tax levels are 
on both the left-hand and right-hand sides of the equation, so they must be solved 
numerically. In addition, we solve the model for road prices for both ICEVs and 
EVs, and for all the stylized states simultaneously. The next step involves inserting 
parameter values into the model and calculating the optimal tax rates. 
4 Numerical model description and parameter values  
In this section, we explain the scenario for calculating optimal tax levels for EV- and 
ICEV-kms. The thought experiment for the calculation can be summarized as: (1) an 
assumption that the optimal kilometer taxes were implemented at the time of writing 
in 2017; (2) there is a medium-run adjustment from agents towards 20206; and (3) 
based on these medium-run adjustments, we get values for the optimal taxes in 2020. 
Our calculations ignore dynamics in the adjustments. We simply calculate the tax 
rates for 2020 with 2020 values on externalities (i.e. values applied today are real-
price adjusted for future years, as is recommended practice for CBA conducted in 
Norway; see, e.g., NOU 2012:16 (2012)). All monetary values are given in 2015 
prices. Applied values for vehicle kilometers and levels of labor and electricity taxes 
are also based on 2015 values. 
Ideally, one would want to have individual tax levels for hundreds of car types based 
on the car’s individual characteristics. In our model, we work with two types of car, 
an ICEV and an EV. The numerical values applied to the ICEVs are based on a 
                                                 
6 This is reflected in the choice of elasticities in the model. A way to think of the changes in a medium 
-run equilibrium in e.g., the transport market, households are able to adjust their driving style, choices 
of destinations and frequencies, and a small fraction of them have had time to change vehicle 
ownership. We would expect e.g., little change in the choice of residential and work place location. 
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weighted average of diesel and gasoline-powered vehicles, weighted by their 
estimated aggregate vehicle kilometers in 20157, based on the BIG model8 at the 
Institute of Transport Economics.  
In the theoretical framework we have taxes on labor, fossil fuel, electricity, vehicle 
purchase and vehicle ownership, ICEV-km and EV-km. In the numerical model, the 
current tax on fossil fuels, along with average tolls in the various states, is converted 
to a corresponding tax on ICEV-kms. When we optimize road prices, drivers will 
face a price that strikes a balance between costs and benefits from mitigating 
transport externalities and distortions in the labor market. That price will give drivers 
the incentive to economize their kilometers appropriately. However, in the corrective 
component of the road prices we find both the distance-dependent external costs 
(e.g., accident risk, local pollution, noise, etc.) and the external cost from fuel usage, 
which in this analysis derives from the social cost of CO2. This cost component gives 
not only incentives for economizing on kilometers but also on fuel use. Changes in 
the external cost of fuel use would induce changes to both kilometers driven and fuel 
efficiency. It can be thought of as if taxes on fuel have been removed from the 
pump, but incorporated within the road price. Parts of the road price for a particular 
car would then differ according to its fuel intensity and be an implicit fuel tax. This 
model technicality is useful when we calculate the shadow price of reaching a GHG 
emissions reduction target at least cost using this road pricing scheme.  
                                                 
7 Gasoline had 59% of the ICEV kms travelled in 2015, while diesel had 41%. To use the weighted 
average of gasoline and diesel as “fossil fuel” is a simplification that allows us to focus on the 
differences between EVs and ICEVs. While there are large differences between diesel and gasoline 
both with regards to external costs and current tax policy (Harding, 2014), the differences between 
electricity and any of the fossil fuels are even larger. 
8 The acronym is derived from “bilgenerasjonsmodell”, meaning “car cohort model”. 
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The government budget constraint must hold in equilibrium. The sum of changes 
from optimized km-tax revenue (that in the initial condition contains current fuel 
taxes and tolls), and subsequent changes in electricity, vehicle purchase and 
ownership tax revenue9, must be offset by changes in the labor tax. This makes the 
equilibrium labor tax rate endogenous. 
The scenario mimics a reform where fuel taxes and tolls are shifted over to distance-
based road prices, differentiated across area, time of day and vehicle type (almost 
exactly the reform recommended for Europe in De Borger and Proost (2015)), which 
are then optimized, taking into account that labor tax rates change to maintain 
revenue neutrality. A situation where optimal road prices lead to a reduction in labor 
tax rates corresponds to a net shift in tax burden from labor income to transport. 
For the transport variables, the representative household in the model is considered 
as a weighted average of values for the different geographical areas we consider. The 
areas are large cities (more than 100 000 inhabitants), small cities (between 15 000 
and 100 000 inhabitants), and rural areas (fewer than 15 000 inhabitants), which 
contain 28%, 32%, and 40% of Norwegian households, respectively. This is the same 
classification as in Thune-Larsen, Veisten, Rødseth, and Klæboe (2014).  
The applied parameter values for the model are given in Table 1. 
                                                 
9 The purchase and ownership taxes per ICEV is assumed to remain constant in this model. This is a 
caveat, as the purchase tax is progressive in both type approved CO2-emissions and NOX-emissions 
per km. Any increase in fuel efficiency in the car fleet will result in a decrease in purchase tax revenue, 
ceteris paribus. On the other hand, with a higher pre-tax cost of more fuel efficient cars, the VAT 
revenue will increase.   
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Table 1: Parameter values for baseline calculations. 
Model parameters Symbol Value Denomination Sources used and additional information 
     
Vehicle technology, usage and ownership     
Initial "fossil" fuel intensity 0
f   
0.079 l/km Institute of Transport Economics, BIG model 
EV electricity intensity (average of winter and summer) 0
p  
0.25 kWh/km Institute of Transport Economics, BIG model 
Initial vehicle kilometrage per car (EV & ICEV), large cities, peak (lp) 0
ilpm   
940 km Institute of Transport Economics, Thune-Larsen 
et al. (2014) and Statistics Norway StatBank 
(2018c) 
[These kms per car per area numbers are 
weighted according to area’s share of households. 
In sum, this results in a national average of 12 230 
km per car] 
Initial vehicle kilometrage per car (EV & ICEV), large cities, off-peak 
(lo) 
0
ilom  
10806 km 
Initial vehicle kilometrage per car (EV & ICEV), small cities (s) 0
ism  
12004 km 
Initial vehicle kilometrage per car (EV & ICEV), rural (r) 0
irm  
12761 km 
ICEVs per household, large cities (Fl) 0
Flv  
0.960 cars Statistics Norway StatBank (2018f), Statistics 
Norway StatBank (2018a), Statistics Norway 
StatBank (2018b) 
[These cars per household per area numbers are 
weighted according to area’s share of households. 
In sum, this results in on average 1.112 ICEVs 
per household and 0.029 EVs per household, 
implying on average 1.141 cars in total per 
Norwegian household] 
ICEVs per household, small cities (Fs) 0
Fsv  
1.128 cars 
ICEVs per household, rural (Fr) 0
Frv  
1.123 cars 
EVs per household, large cities (Pl) 0
Plv  
0.046 cars 
EVs per household, small cities (Ps) 0
Psv  
0.033 cars 
EVs per household, rural (Pr) 0
Prv  
0.015 cars 
Car life-span  16.5 years Fridstrøm, Østli, and Johansen (2016) 
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Prices and taxes     
"Fossil fuel" producer price 
Fr   
6.82 NOK/l Statistics Norway (2015) 
Corresponding initial fossil-km producer price  0.54 NOK/km  
Other private km costs for ICEVs d
Fc  
1.32 NOK/km Vegdirektoratet (2015) 
Electricity consumer price (includes VAT and electricity tax) 
PR   
0.81 NOK/kWh Statistics Norway StatBank (2018e) 
Corresponding EV-km price (includes VAT and electricity tax)  0.20 NOK/km  
Other private km costs for EVs d
Pc  
1.13 NOK/km Vegdirektoratet (2015) 
Initial fossil fuel tax 0
F  
6.58 NOK/l Finansdepartementet (2016) 
Corresponding initial fossil-km tax 0
Fm
   0.52 NOK/km  
Electricity tax per kWh 
P   
0.18 NOK/kWh Finansdepartementet (2016) 
Corresponding electricity tax EVs pay per km  0.045 NOK/km  
     
Average toll, large cities  0.47 NOK/km Calculated from National Public Road 
Administration’s toll statistics and Statistics 
Norway’s passenger car transport statistics. Users 
pay per passing of tolling station, but the 
numbers have been normalized to per km. 
Average toll, small cities  0.25 NOK/km 
Average toll, rural  0.11 NOK/km 
Purchase tax + VAT for ICEV  164892 NOK Based on disaggregate car sales data provided by 
Norwegian Road Federation (OVF).  
Purchase tax + VAT for EV  0 NOK 
Annual ownership tax for ICEV  3565 NOK Finansdepartementet (2016) 
Annual ownership tax for EV  435 NOK 
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Real discount rate for purchase tax annuity  2%  Risk-free component in real discount rate applied 
in CBA (NOU 2012:16, 2012). In addition, car 
loans are usually given at 4%–5% and the 
Norwegian inflation target is 2.5%. 
Average marginal labor tax rate (benchmark) 
L   
40%  Bjertnæs (2015) 
     
Household behavior parameters     
Own-price elasticity of fossil fuel intensity (i.e. the isolated elasticity 
component for fuel efficiency w.r.t. consumer fuel price) f
   -0.092  Norsk Petroleumsinstitutt (2011) 
Own-price elasticity of ICEV kilometers 
FM
  -0.152  Rekdal and Larsen (2008) 
Own-price elasticity of EV kilometers 
PM
  -0.152  Rekdal and Larsen (2008) 
Own-price elasticity of ICEV ownership w.r.t. costs per km F
F
v
M  
-0.121  Boug, Dyvi, Johansen, and Naug (2002) 
 
Own-price elasticity of EV ownership w.r.t. costs per km P
P
v
M  
-0.121  
Cross-price elasticity of EV kilometers i.e. how ICEV ownership 
increases when the cost of EV-km increases 
F
P
v
M  
0.0015  Institute of Transport Economics, BIG-model 
Cross-price elasticity of ICEV kilometers, i.e. how EV ownership 
increases when the cost of ICEV-km increases 
P
F
v
M  
0.486  Institute of Transport Economics, BIG-model 
Income elasticity of vehicle kilometers 
MI  
0.185  Steinsland and Madslien (2007) 
Compensated income elasticity of vehicle kilometers c
MI  
0.151  Weighting estimates from West and Williams III 
(2007) on average Norwegian household 
demographics 
Income elasticity of labor supply 
LI  
-0.03  Correspondence with Thor-Olav Thoresen on 
LOTTE-model at Statistics Norway, documented 
in Dagsvik, Jia, Kornstad, and Thoresen (2007)  
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Labor supply elasticity (uncompensated) 
LL  
0.178  Dagsvik et al. (2007) 
Labor supply elasticity (compensated) c
LL  
0.208  c
LL LL LI     
     
Externalities from car transport     
External congestion costs per kilometer, initially, large cities, peak  0cme M   
6.339 NOK/veh-km 
Thune-Larsen et al. (2014) 
Calibrated congestion function parameter – marginal congestion cost 
per km as a linear function of total vehicle km driving in peak hours. 
This can be considered a sub-component of 
c
me  
 0.0237  
External non-congestion costs per km ICEV, large cities, peak (lp) 
F
nc
m lpe  
0.958 NOK/veh-km 
External non-congestion costs per km EV, large cities, peak (lp) 
P
nc
m lpe  
0.423 NOK/ veh-km 
External non-congestion costs per km ICEV, large cities, off-peak (lo) 
F
nc
m loe  
0.823 NOK/ veh-km 
External non-congestion costs per km EV, large cities, off-peak (lo) 
P
nc
m loe  
0.423 NOK/ veh-km 
External non-congestion costs per km ICEV, small cities (s) 
F
nc
m se  
0.492 NOK/ veh-km 
External non-congestion costs per km EV, small cities (s) 
P
nc
m se  
0.419 NOK/ veh-km 
External non-congestion costs per km ICEV, rural (r) 
F
nc
m re  
0.171 NOK/ veh-km 
External non-congestion costs per km EV, rural (r) 
P
nc
m re  
0.161 NOK/ veh-km 
Fossil fuel related external costs 
Fe  
1.034 NOK/l Based on recommended social cost of carbon 
(420 NOK/ton) from NOU 2015:15 (2016) 
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Values for the external costs from road transport are all taken from Thune-Larsen et al. (2014), a report made for the Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Transport and Communications and The Ministry of Climate and Environment, that now serves as official guideline 
parameters for conducting CBA in Norway10. The congestion costs in this report are estimated for both freight and passenger car 
transport. We only apply the estimates for passenger car transport, implicitly assuming a constant level of freight transport. The external 
non-congestion costs consist of (with each component’s share of the national average estimate in parenthesis) external cost estimates for 
local pollution (25%), noise (3%), accident risk (55%), road wear (<1%) and winter management (16%). The component that causes the 
largest differences between large cities, small cities and rural areas is the local pollution component. This component is set to zero for 
EVs, and is the only difference between EVS and ICEVs with regards to non-congestion costs per km11. More information about the 
parameter values is given in Appendix C. 
 
                                                 
10 Other possible external cost estimates could include estimates from the IMF (Parry, Heine, Lis, & Li, 2014), but they only provide a national average for external 
costs, and we make a point of using estimates that vary across areas and times of day. Applying the parameters specifically estimated for the Norwegian context and 
recommended by official guidelines, also makes this exercise more relevant for a Norwegian policy discussion. This is also discussed in the sensitivity analysis. 
11 Note that EVs are assumed to have the same noise cost per km as ICEVs in spite of the higher engine noise from the latter. This is because noise from tires on 
asphalt dominates at speeds over 30 km/h according to Thune-Larsen et al. (2014). In any case, noise makes up a relatively small portion of the external costs, even in 
large cities.  
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5 Model results  
Here we present the calculations of the second-best distance-based road prices 
differentiated by vehicle and spatiotemporal state. Main results are given in Table 2. 
Baseline second-best road pricing 
The model calculates road prices that vary significantly between states and car types, 
largely reflecting the variation in external costs. This can be seen in Table 2. The 
highest price is on driving an ICEV in a large city during peak hours, mainly because 
of the external congestion costs. However, the marginal external congestion costs are 
lower in the new equilibrium than in the initial situation, as the transport volumes 
during peak hours have been reduced significantly for both EVs and ICEVs. It is still 
worth noting that the tax per kilometer is more than five times higher than the 
current sum of average toll and fuel tax per kilometer during peak hours. 
The lowest price is on driving an ICEV in rural areas. The tax per kilometer is 
actually 60% lower in the new equilibrium than the sum of average toll and fuel tax 
per kilometer was initially. It is also worth noting that the optimal road price for 
ICEVs in rural areas is actually lower than for EVs in these areas. This is also the 
case for driving in small cities. Hence, the current preferential treatment of EV use, 
essentially facing zero taxation (except for general electricity taxation), is way below 
optimal road pricing. 
In all cases there is a markup from the revenue recycling component, showing the 
efficiency gain from replacing revenue from labor taxation with revenue from road 
pricing. We can also see that the tax interaction component lowers the final road 
prices. This is because of the negative impact that the total changes in road prices 
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and labor taxes have on labor supply. The impact on other tax revenue leads to 
higher total road price levels. The exception is for ICEV driving in rural areas, small 
cities and cities off peak, as the negative impact on other tax revenue becomes 
greater. Incentivizing EV driving over ICEV driving in these states will result in 
lower tax revenues from, for example, purchase taxes, with inadequate substitution 
from EV road prices. This is why the impact on other tax revenue drives the EV 
road price upwards. This shows some of the endogeneity between road prices, and 
how they affect the size of each other’s tax interaction component, which again will 
affect the revenue recycling component and the total road price level. In all cases the 
final road price is greater than the corrective component that targets the 
internalization of externalities, with the exception of driving ICEV in rural areas, 
where the final road price is even lower than its direct external cost. For this case, the 
tax interaction component has a larger impact on the final price than the revenue 
recycling component.  
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Table 2: Results from model calculations of second-best road prices in 2020. Road prices are given in 2015 
NOK per km for a given state. 
Vehicle 
type and 
state 
Corrective 
component 
– own 
vehicle 
Corrective 
component 
– indirect 
impact 
Revenue 
recycling 
component 
Tax 
interaction 
component – 
labor market 
and 
congestion12 
Tax 
interaction 
component 
– other taxes 
Total Initial 
(tolls 
and 
fuel tax 
per 
km) 
EV cities 
peak hours 5.33 -0.89 6.66 -5.17 1.30 7.24 0.00 
ICEV cities 
peak hours 6.01 -1.10 7.68 -5.93 1.33 7.97 0.99 
EV cities 
off-peak 0.42 -0.13 1.93 -1.40 0.16 0.97 0.00 
ICEV cities 
off-peak  0.96 -0.09 2.65 -1.92 -0.28 1.31 0.99 
EV small 
cities 0.42 -0.22 1.85 -1.34 0.16 0.88 0.00 
ICEV small 
cities 0.63 -0.03 2.17 -1.54 -0.53 0.68 0.77 
EV rural 
areas 0.16 -0.25 1.64 -1.17 0.22 0.59 0.00 
ICEV rural 
areas 0.31 -0.01 1.83 -1.27 -0.61 0.23 0.63 
 
In all states, the optimal km-taxes are higher than their current levels for EVs. For 
ICEVs, however, the optimal km-taxes are lower than current levels of fuel taxes and 
tolls with the exception of large cities. It seems that ICEVs are taxed higher than 
optimal in most parts of the country. Hence, the optimal car travel volumes are 
higher than current volumes in these areas. This results in total 0.2% more vehicle 
kilometers travelled per household, from 14 129 to 14 150 km per year, despite a 
large reduction in city driving. The model also finds 0.5% lower rates of average 
vehicle ownership, from 1.152 to 1.146 cars per household. The impacts differ 
greatly between states. In large cities, EV ownership rates increase by 36% as the 
                                                 
12 Including congestion feedback where relevant, i.e. in cities peak hours. 
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cross-price effect from the road price on ICEVs dominates the own-price effect for 
EVs. At the same time, ownership rates of ICEVs drop by 8% in large cities. For the 
rest of the country, the effects are in the opposite direction. On average, ownership 
rates for EVs increase by about 11%, while the rates for ICEVs fall by 0.8%.  
Because the model results indicate over-taxation of ICEVs in most parts of the 
country in the initial situation, the net revenue from the road-pricing scheme is lower 
than the initial revenue. This indicates that in optimum it is better with a slightly 
higher labor tax burden than a higher tax burden from road pricing, given the same 
government budget constraint. The total increase in labor taxes corresponds to an 
increase in the average marginal tax rate from 40% to 40.1%. This could be an effect 
of Norway currently having among the world’s highest taxes on gasoline and diesel, 
but it is worth noting that there are several European countries with similar or higher 
fuel taxes (U.S. Department of Energy, 2018).  
In order to calculate the welfare effect of this road pricing scheme, we numerically 
integrate the marginal welfare impact (shown in eq. (10) and rewritten in eq. (B.7)). 
When numerically integrating the marginal welfare effect for all road prices, we end 
up with an annual welfare gain of NOK 255 (about €28 or $33) per household. By 
comparison, Tscharaktschiew (2014) finds a welfare gain of €13 per household when 
optimizing gasoline taxation. It is worth noting that the welfare gain is the national per 
capita average. The gain will be higher in large cities where congestion would be 
curbed (making it comparable to welfare gains found in urban road pricing case 
studies such as Andre De Palma, Lindsey, and Niskanen (2006)), and somewhat 
lower in rural areas. 
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What are the GHG emission implications when values such as these are applied in 
the model and second-best road prices are calculated? The applied social cost of 
carbon (SCC) of NOK 420 per ton (about €47 or $53) is the parameter 
Fe  in the 
corrective component in the ICEV road price that gives a direct incentive to 
economize fuel, while the road price as a whole gives an incentive to economize 
kilometers. It is equivalent to moving fuel tax from the pump, but incorporating it in 
road pricing that would differ with the vehicle’s fuel intensity. The SCC is lower than 
the current tax on fuel, so fuel efficiency incentives become weaker in the new 
optimized equilibrium. This leads to agents choosing ca 5% lower average fuel 
efficiency. With almost unchanged travel demand in the nation as a whole, the annual 
GHG emissions from transport increase by 5.1% in optimum. It is clear that 
reducing GHG emissions through an optimal road-pricing scheme implies that the 
carbon price would have to be higher than the recommended values. 
Optimal road prices and a shadow price on CO2 
The Norwegian government’s goal by 2030 is to reduce GHG emissions from 1990 
levels by 40%. In 2016, annual emissions were about 3% higher than in 1990. For the 
road transport sector, emissions were about 28% higher13. We consider now a 
binding emission reduction requirement for passenger car transport from 2015 levels 
(the initial situation in the model) to about 2020, when the new equilibrium following 
the policy change would be reached. We consider a 15% reduction to be roughly in 
line with the necessary trajectory for the emission reduction requirement to be met. 
                                                 
13 Statistics Norway: StatBank: Table: 08940: Greenhouse gases, by source, energy product and 
pollutant 1990 – 2016 (retrieved November 2017). 
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For this exercise, we set a constraint on equilibrium emissions. We allow the carbon 
price component in the road price (in effect, the fuel tax) to not be set equal to the 
recommended SCC, but to vary freely. The model will solve given constraints for the 
optimal road pricing scheme where the carbon price component will serve as a 
shadow price for the emission constraint. We then have the case of achieving the 
emission reductions in the most efficient pricing scheme available, i.e. reducing 
emissions at least cost. The results are given in Table 3. 
Table 3: Results from model calculations of second-best road prices in 2020 under a GHG emission 
constraint of 15% reduction from 2015 levels. Road prices are given in 2015 NOK per km for a given state. 
Vehicle 
type and 
state 
Corrective 
component 
– own 
vehicle 
Corrective 
component 
– indirect 
impact 
Revenue 
recycling 
component 
Tax interaction 
component – 
labor market 
and congestion 
Tax 
interaction 
component 
– other taxes 
Total 
EV cities 
peak hours 5.10 -0.82 5.39 -4.18 1.22 6.72 
ICEV cities 
peak hours 7.72 -1.33 7.71 -5.99 1.56 9.65 
EV cities 
off-peak 0.42 -0.24 1.63 -1.18 0.30 0.94 
ICEV cities 
off-peak  2.91 -0.12 3.29 -2.46 -0.74 2.86 
EV small 
cities 0.42 -0.48 1.46 -1.04 0.32 0.67 
ICEV small 
cities 2.58 -0.05 2.71 -2.00 -1.25 1.97 
EV rural 
areas 0.16 -1.05 1.35 -0.96 1.00 0.50 
ICEV rural 
areas 2.26 -0.01 2.27 -1.65 -1.55 1.30 
 
The most notable difference in Table 3 compared to Table 2 is that the road price for 
ICEVs increases for driving in all states. The increase is between 20% (driving in 
large cities during peak hours) and 550% (driving in rural areas). The same 
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comparison for EVs results in reductions for all states. The reduction is between 7% 
(driving in large cities in off-peak hours) and 24% (driving in small cities). These road 
price changes working against the ICEV arise from a substantial increase in the 
carbon price component, now the shadow price of the emission constraint. This 
shadow price is given in Table 4 alongside the social cost of carbon (SCC) and the 
initial fuel tax (59% gasoline, 41% diesel) measured in NOK per liter. 
Table 4: Fuel taxes/carbon cost component in road price. 2015 NOK per liter. 
 Initial fuel tax 
(including VAT) 
Social cost of 
carbon (SCC) 
Shadow price of 
emission constraint 
NOK per liter 
fossil fuel 
6.58 1.034 17.37 
 
It can be seen from Table 4 that the shadow price of the emission constraint is about 
16 times the SCC, which corresponds to a carbon price of NOK 7057/ton (about 
€784 or $882). We can also see that the carbon cost component exceeds the initial 
fuel tax by about 150%. This means that to achieve the emissions reduction target at 
least cost alongside an optimized road pricing scheme would not just be a question 
of “shifting from fuel tax and tolls to road price”, it would require increasing the tax 
burden on both fossil fuel and kilometers. 
So how do agents reduce their emissions at least cost? They could drive ICEVs less 
and/or more efficiently (or replace them with more efficient ICEVs). The results 
show an approximate 10.3% drop in total household driving with ICEVs and average 
fuel intensity drops by about 5.3%. Some of the reduction in ICEV kilometers 
materializes in a shift from ICEV to EV ownership. The results show about 9.6% 
fewer kilometers driven in total when EVs are included. EV ownership has increased 
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by about 33% nationwide (even higher in cities). On the ICEV side, ownership rates 
have dropped by about 5.5% nationwide. 
The increase in road pricing in this scenario means larger cuts in labor taxation. The 
total reduction in labor taxes corresponds to a drop in the average marginal tax rate 
from 40% to 37%. However, this is not enough to save the scenario from 
substantially less welfare compared to the initial situation. In this scenario, each 
household gets a welfare decrease of NOK 219 per year. The calculation assumes 
that the actual welfare cost of a ton of GHG is NOK 420, the SCC, even though a 
higher shadow price has been forced on the transport sector. The high shadow price 
for the emission constraint reflects high welfare costs from large-scale CO2 
abatement within the transport sector. For the Norwegian economy as a whole, the 
shadow price of a CO2 constraint like this would probably be lower, because the 
existing emissions taxation is generally lower than in the transport sector (see e.g., 
NOU 2015:15, 2016), so cheaper abatement opportunities would be exploited.    
Sensitivity analysis and alternative scenarios 
The model results are reliant on the parameter values, which in some cases derive 
from uncertain estimates (see e.g., Thune-Larsen et al., 2014). We therefore provide 
sensitivity analysis to show how uncertainty in the underlying parameters creates 
uncertainty in the results. This applies for estimates of both external costs14 and 
behavioral relationships, i.e. elasticities. We focus mainly on testing the sensitivity of 
                                                 
14 Many of the uncertainties underlying these estimates are discussed in Thune-Larsen et al. (2014), 
and the external cost estimates for Norway in this report differ somewhat from those found in Parry, 
Heine, et al. (2014). For example, the latter finds national average marginal accident costs per km to be 
about the same as the former, but finds lower local pollution costs per liter of fuel (about half) than in 
the former, mostly due to lower average emission factors. 
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the elasticity values. The implications for road price levels of higher/lower external 
cost values are easier to imagine; we have already shown the implications of higher 
carbon costs. 
There are many ways to do sensitivity analysis. A common practice is varying the 
central parameters one-by-one to show how a change in one parameter affects the 
result. We often find it more rewarding to vary a set of variables simultaneously in a 
consistent scenario, which is useful in showing the range of outcomes, and helps the 
reader see the uncertainty in terms of different “stories”. 
Two of our scenarios focus on uncertainty about how the agents will respond in the 
transport market, i.e. uncertainty in transport-related elasticity parameters. In one of 
the scenarios, the agents turn out to be less responsive to transport policies, and vice 
versa for the other. The parameters we vary in the two scenarios are given in Table 5. 
Table 5: Direction and relative change of parameter values in two scenarios for sensitivity analysis on 
responsiveness in transport markets. 
Elasticity parameter More responsive 
transport market 
(MRTM) 
Less responsive 
transport market 
(LRTM) 
Own-price elasticity of fossil intensity + 30% – 30% 
Own-price elasticity of ICEV kilometrage + 30% – 30% 
Own-price elasticity of EV kilometrage + 30% – 30% 
Own-price elasticity of ICEV purchase 
w.r.t. ICEV km cost 
+ 30% – 30% 
Own-price elasticity of EV purchase w.r.t. 
EV km cost 
+ 30% – 30% 
Cross-price elasticity of ICEV purchase 
w.r.t. EV km cost 
+ 30% – 30% 
Cross-price elasticity of EV purchase 
w.r.t. ICEV km cost 
+ 30% – 30% 
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The next two scenarios focus on the uncertainty concerning how agents will respond 
in the labor market. In one of them, we look at the case where agent behavior in the 
labor market is less responsive to changes, and vice versa in the other scenario. The 
parameters we vary in the two scenarios are given in Table 6. 
Table 6: Direction and relative change of parameter values in two scenarios for sensitivity analysis on 
responsiveness in labor markets. 
Elasticity parameter More responsive 
labor market 
(MRLM) 
Less responsive 
labor market 
(LRLM) 
Labor supply elasticity (uncompensated) + 30% – 30% 
Income elasticity of labor + 30%  – 30% 
 
We add two more scenarios that test the implications of different developments for 
EV purchases and EV purchase taxes. The first considers the case where the stock of 
EVs has doubled at the expense of ICEVs, i.e. a doubling of the EV share under the 
same car fleet size. This is particularly relevant since the growth of EV’s has been 
fairly large since 2015, the base year of the analysis. This scenario is denoted 2X EV. 
The last scenario considers the case where the government relaxes the biggest 
incentive for purchasing EVs, namely the exemption from VAT. A 25% VAT on the 
average EV sold in Norway would correspond to NOK 91 558 on top of the sales 
price. This is implemented in the model as an increase in the purchase tax annuity for 
EVs. In addition, EVs will pay the same annual ownership tax as ICEVs, which 
corresponds to an increase from NOK 455 to NOK 3 565 NOK per year. This 
scenario is denoted EV VAT.  
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The resulting second-best road price levels in these scenarios are given in Table 7. 
Table 7: Results from model calculations of second-best road prices in 2020 under various scenarios. Road 
prices are given in 2015 NOK per km for a given state. 
Vehicle type and 
state 
Base-
line 
MR-
TM 
LR-
TM 
MR-
LM 
LR-
LM 
2X 
EV 
EV 
VAT 
EV cities peak hours 7.24 6.27 9.21 10.78 4.97 8.95 7.21 
ICEV cities peak hours 7.97 6.89 10.20 13.64 5.33 39.90 8.01 
EV cities off-peak 0.97 0.78 1.40 2.19 0.23 0.62 0.96 
ICEV cities off-peak  1.31 1.08 1.79 3.04 0.44 5.50 1.35 
EV small cities 0.88 0.67 1.32 2.06 0.16 0.72 0.88 
ICEV small cities 0.68 0.53 1.00 1.56 0.10 1.53 0.70 
EV rural areas 0.59 0.32 1.16 2.51 -0.34 0.50 0.60 
ICEV rural areas 0.23 0.13 0.45 0.83 -0.20 0.21 0.24 
 
The four scenarios that test sensitivity to elasticity values show that relatively 
moderate ranges (±30%) for these values lead to relatively large ranges for optimal 
taxes; 30% larger transport-related elasticity values leads to 45% to 87% lower 
optimal road prices compared to baseline. The direction is not surprising, as more 
responsiveness makes it less attractive to tax because the agents are more willing to 
reduce kilometrage and ownership and/or switch to another vehicle in response to 
prices. The absolute value of both the revenue recycling and tax interaction 
components becomes smaller, but it is the reduced revenue recycling component that 
is predominant. The corresponding road prices in the LRTM scenario are 27% to 
96% higher than the baseline. 
The more responsive the agents are in the labor market, the higher the road price; 
30% greater elasticities for own-price and income elasticity with respect to labor 
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supply resulted in 49% to 320% higher road prices compared to the baseline. This is 
because larger own-price elasticity of labor supply drives up the marginal cost of 
public funds and in turn the revenue recycling component; income elasticity drives 
up the value of the tax interaction component (makes it less negative). At the 
opposite end, road prices in the LRLM scenario are 31% to 184% lower than the 
baseline. The labor supply elasticity and income elasticity of labor are estimated to be 
relatively small in the Norwegian LOTTE modeling system at Statistics Norway (see 
e.g., Dagsvik et al., 2007), namely 0.178 and –0.03, respectively15. This makes the 
optimal prices quite sensitive to changes in these parameters. 
In the 2X EV scenario it can be seen that a doubled initial stock of EVs implies 
higher road prices for ICEVs in large and small cities, but lower in rural areas. As for 
EVs, the optimal road price becomes lower, with the exception of cities during peak 
hours. This is mainly because for given elasticities16 the absolute changes related to 
EV stock will be larger and for ICEV stock lower. This increases the absolute value 
of parameters for household shifting to EV km and EV ownership when ICEV road 
prices increase, and shifting from EV ownership when EV road prices increase 
(parameters P , P  and P ). Conversely, the corresponding parameters for ICEVs 
decrease in absolute value. This will tend to lower road prices for EVs and increase 
for ICEVs.  
                                                 
15 These elasticity values are well within the normal range found in the meta-study by Bargain and 
Peichl (2016), although somewhat in the lower end in absolute value. The labor supply elasticity is a 
national average, and it is lower for men and higher for women in absolute value, as is common. The 
study mentions how the labor supply elasticity for women in Nordic countries seem to be relatively 
low (closer to those of men), as seems to be a pattern in countries with relatively high participation 
rates for women in the labor force.   
16 A large change in shares for the two car types would probably imply changes to their respective 
cross-price elasticities, but this was not included in the sensitivity analysis. 
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In the EV VAT scenario we can see that removing the VAT exemption for EVs 
would imply a 1% to 4% higher road price for ICEVs, while for EVs there is hardly 
any change (1% or less). The changes are driven by the impact the annual tax 
revenue per vehicle has on the tax interaction component of the road price. When 
there is VAT on EVs, a higher road price on ICEVs is, on the margin, less of a fiscal 
problem, as the government revenue loss from a switch to EVs becomes smaller. 
This is similar to Tscharaktschiew (2015) finding that introducing EV purchase 
subsidies reduces the optimal gasoline tax.  
We also find that removing the VAT exemption for EVs increases the welfare 
potential for the second-best road pricing scheme by about 1% compared to the 
baseline results. This welfare increase would be in addition to whatever gains made 
from alternative use of the revenue the government would have earned if EVs had 
the same VAT rate as other cars. In 2017, the VAT exempted from EV purchases 
added up to 3.2 bn. NOK (Ministry of Finance, 2018).  
These sensitivity tests give some indication of how this model would produce 
different optimal road prices for different countries. Elasticity estimates in the 
transport market are a bit on the low side for Norway (further discussed in Appendix 
C) compared to other countries, leading one to expect that optimal road prices will 
be higher in Norway, than in most other countries. Norway also seems to put a 
higher value on external costs, and also has relatively high fuel taxes and tolls as a 
part of government revenue compared to other countries, which also leads us to 
expect that Norwegian road prices would be higher than in most countries. On the 
other hand, elasticities in the Norwegian labor market seems to be in the lower end. 
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If other countries’ labor force is more responsive to labor tax changes, it would drive 
road prices upwards and labor taxes downwards, compared to Norway. 
6 Discussion and conclusion  
Here we go through the research questions and how they have been answered. 
What characterizes the set of second-best road prices targeting external costs from driving EVs and 
ICEVs when there are distortionary labor taxes and binding government budget constraints?  
The short answer to this question is that it is characterized by 1) large price 
differentials between states, 2) ICEVs face a higher cost in large cities but lower costs 
in most parts of the country compared to the initial situation, even if it leads to a 
slightly higher labor tax rate, and 3) EVs should not be untaxed. In sum, the road 
pricing scheme leads to higher welfare. 
It is common to find that driving is undertaxed and labor overtaxed in previous 
literature using the analytical framework developed by Parry and Small (2005) and 
other authors referenced in the Introduction. In our study, we found that driving in 
large cities is undertaxed, and in the rest of the country the opposite. This 
demonstrates how analyzing a road pricing scheme that differs over four 
spatiotemporal states and two car types adds more nuance and insight than, for 
example, analyzing a single gasoline tax. It also takes the big differences in external 
costs between spatiotemporal states seriously. The extended analytical framework can 
serve as a tool for calculating second-best road prices in other countries as well, but, 
as the calculations and the sensitivity analysis show, using parameters relevant for the 
national context is important. 
How are these prices affected by tax distortions in the labor, electricity and car ownership market? 
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We find that interaction with the rest of the fiscal system generally leads to a price 
markup on the external costs. The differences between states and car types largely 
reflect the differences in external costs per kilometer, the corrective component, but 
also an interaction component that reflects how the km-tax in a given state with a 
given car type interacts with the rest of the fiscal system. Within this interaction 
component there are two opposing forces. Revenue recycling through reducing labor 
taxation drives up road prices, while road price interaction with the labor market and 
the rest of the tax system generally drives the price down. We can also see that VAT 
exemption for EVs drives the optimal road price for ICEVs downwards in order to 
reduce the shift to EVs and the subsequent loss of government revenue. The VAT 
exemption also reduces the overall welfare potential from the road pricing scheme. 
How does this second-best pricing fit with government-set goals of reducing CO2 emissions? 
The second-best road pricing scheme applies the recommended social cost of carbon 
of NOK 420 per ton, which in turn reflects the part of the road price that directly 
concerns fossil fuel. Using the SCC, the direct tax on fuel becomes lower than in the 
initial situation, giving less incentive to strive towards fuel efficiency. So even though 
the road pricing scheme gives incentives to economize on travel distance (depending 
on the state), the net effect on GHG emissions is actually an increase. The short 
answer to the research question is: as long as the optimal road pricing scheme applies 
the recommended SCC, it will not contribute much to reaching the government 
emission target. This means that the goal of reducing CO2 emissions from passenger 
car transport implies a higher carbon price than the recommended SCC.  
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In order to reach a 15% emission reduction requirement at least cost, a shadow price 
of carbon 16 times the SCC is needed. This is reflected in road prices that are 
between 20% and 550% higher for ICEVs and between 7% and 24% lower for EVs 
compared to the second-best optimum. Adaptation to these prices comes mainly 
through the ICEVs being driven less, but also through increased fuel efficiency. 
Some of the reduced driving of ICEVs is reflected in a big increase in EV driving.  
The large-scale CO2 abatement within the transport sector comes at a high welfare 
cost, which reveals a large mismatch between the SCC and the government’s 
emission target. This can be interpreted as a goal conflict between welfare 
maximization and ambitious emission targets. This is in line with De Borger and 
Proost (2015), who claim that too much emphasis has been put on climate issues, 
compared to the other market imperfections related to the transport sector. It is 
worth noting that for the Norwegian economy as a whole the cost would lower as 
cheaper abatement opportunities outside the transport sector would be exploited. 
This was the conclusion for Belgium in Proost et al. (2009). Mayeres and Proost 
(2013) also find marginal abatement costs of many hundred Euros when pursuing 
narrow measures within the transport sector.  
Concluding remarks 
As many great transport economists have suggested before, there are good reasons 
for policy makers to look closely at road pricing as a future main instrument for 
regulating transport. We make the case for distance-based road pricing, differentiated 
across vehicle types and pre-defined areas and time periods using satellite technology.  
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These results suggest that such a road pricing scheme is likely to be welfare 
enhancing. In the case of Norway, a policy implication would be to start the formal 
process of investigating how to design and implement such a road pricing scheme. 
This paper and the extended modeling framework can serve as input for analysis in 
such a process. 
There are some caveats worth mentioning. Even though the model expressions are a 
bit messy and a bit tedious to derive, it is still a fairly simple static model with one 
representative household. Future extensions could include heterogeneous agents, 
public transport, freight transport, and a more comprehensive treatment of the car 
purchase tax system, which already provides incentives for lower emission vehicles. 
The opportunity to substitute driving in one state with another (in particular driving 
in peak and off-peak hours in large cities), and the cost of establishing and running 
such a road pricing scheme would also be promising extension. Distributional 
impacts and political feasibility could also be looked at more closely. The modeling 
involves moving from one static equilibrium to another, and the numerical modeling 
is based on 2015 being an equilibrium situation, although in many respects it could 
be considered transitory, at least with regard to the EV stock. We try to incorporate 
this within the analysis through sensitivity testing. 
The numerical results also have their caveats, as they are based on estimates obtained 
from noisy data. Our sensitivity analysis shows us that changes in uncertain 
behavioral parameters could imply a wide range of different optimal road prices. This 
brings us to another policy implication: If a formal process of investigating satellite-
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based road pricing is undertaken, the process should be mindful of these 
uncertainties with regard to design and implementation planning. 
The development of satellite-based road pricing for passenger cars in Singapore and 
the trials in Oregon and California are exciting developments in real-world transport 
economics. Theory and numerical simulations make a good case for such a scheme. 
As the share of EVs grow, the case will get even better17. However, many steps need 
to be taken before satellite-based road pricing can be seen widely in the real world. 
Citizens may be skeptical, for instance about privacy concerns (Duncan, Nadella, 
Giroux, Bowers, & Graham, 2017). However, the Data Protection Agency in 
Norway claims that a satellite-based road pricing scheme could be designed to 
respect (and maybe even enhance) privacy protection18. Principles such as ownership 
of the data belonging to the car owner, and the scheme not being useable for detailed 
tracking without informed consent, would to a large degree align such a scheme with 
privacy concerns.  
Another important real-world factor is how the scheme would take form after a 
political process. Politics and other constraints could easily reduce the efficiency of 
such schemes (see e.g., Anthoff & Hahn, 2010; Evans, 1992), and could hinder them 
from being implemented in the first place. We saw in the case of the Dutch attempt 
to design a national road pricing scheme that politics was the main reason for the 
                                                 
17 In a future with autonomous cars, where the generalized travel cost could get greatly reduced, and 
the average occupancy rate of cars could drop (e.g., if autonomous cars drive people to work, drive 
back home empty, and drive empty to the workplace at the end of the day to pick up again), regulating 
transport demand with distance-based road pricing using satellite technology could be essential. 
18 http://www.ofv.no/artikler-2017/dynamisk-veiprising-kan-fjerne-bomstasjonene-article515-
299.html (in Norwegian, easily translated using translation software) [last accessed April 5th 2018]. 
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project being stopped in 2011 after years of progress, seemingly close to the finishing 
line (Geerlings, Shiftan, & Stead, 2012).  
Attempts to develop satellite-based road pricing schemes may finally be successful, 
or they could continue to fail. In any case, valuable learning experiences will be 
gained, and we strongly believe contributing to the body of knowledge on road 
pricing is a worthy pursuit. 
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Appendix A. Deriving second-best road prices 
 We follow many of the same analytical steps as in Tscharaktschiew (2015) when we 
here derive optimal road prices.  
The household’s optimization program is to maximize the utility function Eq. (1) 
with respect to the choice variables , , , , , ,F F P Pm v f m v p X and l  subject to 
monetary budget Eq. (4) and time constraints Eq. (7). Households treat travel times 
(affected by aggregate kilometrage), external environmental damages and all tax levels 
as given. We form the Lagrangian – where   is the Lagrange multiplier for the 
complete economic household budget constraint and can be interpreted as the 
marginal utility of income. We get first-order conditions (FOCs) from the 
optimization and use these to obtain the household’s indirect utility function, which 
yields maximized utility given prices, taxes and income, but also travel time and 
externalities determined by the aggregate level of driving. 
The government’s optimization program is then to maximize the household’s 
indirect utility function with respect to a set of parameters 
 , , , , , , ,
F Pm m P F P L
t E       . These parameters, policy variables and time and 
environmental externalities, are treated as given by the households.  
 (A.1)
   
, , , , , , ,
( ) max ( , , , , , , , )
( ) ( )
(1 ) ( ( ) )
F F P P
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F F P P
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d d
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The policy instrument subject to change in its level is the km-tax for EVs. At the 
same time, changes in governmental tax revenue, per kilometer travel time, and 
external costs are considered explicitly. 
The analytical exercise of deriving the optimal tax on EV-km, 
Pm
 , starts by total 
differentiation of the household’s indirect utility function with respect to 
Pm
 . For 
optimization of ( )V   through 
Pm
 , with revenue recycling through L  we can 
consider the policy instruments 
Fm
 , 
F , P , P  and F  as fixed in this exercise. 
Assuming 0
m
F F P P F
mm m m mPP P P P
d
d d d d
d d d d d

 
    
      , we get: 
(A.2) 
P P P P P
L
m m L m m m
ddV V V V dt V dE
d d t d E d

     
   
   
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where 
(A.3) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
P P P
F P
m mF PP P
F P
m m mF P
F PM MF P
F PM F M P
E F E PV dE V dF V dP
E d F d P dE F E P
E M E MdM dMV V
M d M dE M E M 
  
 
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 
   
  
 
  
  
represents (dis-)utility stemming from a marginal change in aggregate externalities via 
changes in a car’s energy consumption and kilometrage caused by a marginal increase 
in the km-tax for EVs. From here on, we assume that there are no externalities 
associated with producing and consuming electricity for EVs, i.e. ( ) 0PE P  . This is 
further discussed in section 2. (A.2) can then be rewritten as: 
The final publication is available in: Transportation Research Part D: Transport and 
Environment. 2018, 65 (1), 635-657. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trd.2018.10.002 
53 
 
(A.4) 
'
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p p P p P
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V E
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Replacing partial derivative terms , ,
m LP
V V V
t 
  
    yields: 
(A.5) 
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We divide both sides by  , the marginal utility of income, and get the welfare 
change in monetary terms: 
(A.6) 
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In order to derive L
mP
d
d

  we totally differentiate the government budget constraint 
(remember W=wL and only electric cars receive tax benefits): 
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yielding 
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(A.8)
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We set the expressions 
im i i i i
m pm    equal to 
iD  for notational simplicity. 
Equating 
Pm
dGOV d  to zero and solving for 
PL m
d d   yields: 
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Plugging Eq. (A.9) into Eq.(A.6), recalling P P F FM m v m v   (see Eq.(3)), gives: 
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We define the value of travel time as 1 (1 )V LT w  


    , where 0V
T


  is the 
household’s disutility from aggregate travel time. It also follows from Eq. (2) that 
'
m mp P
dt dM
d d
t  . When we replace both of these expressions in Eq. (A.10) we get: 
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For notational simplicity we rewrite the expressions for marginal external costs 
(marginal external damage expressed in monetary terms) stemming from the 
consumption of fuel and kilometrage 
(A.12) 
1
'
FF E F
e V E

   
(A.13)   'cme M t M   
(A.14) 
1
'
F M FF
nc
m E Me V E

   
(A.15) 
1
'
P M PP
nc
m E Me V E

   
We also reorganize the expression to get a clearer view of the marginal welfare effect 
of the km-tax: 
(A.16)
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As we can see, the EV-km tax causes numerous different changes in Eq. (A.16), 
which shows that the km-tax affects overall welfare through various channels.  
Deriving second-best road prices 
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We set the marginal welfare change seen in Eq. (A.16) equal to zero and solve for 
Pm
 . This gives us the following expression:  
(A.17)
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We simplify the following expressions into reaction parameters. 
(A.18) 
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(A.21) 
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
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The expression in (A.17) can be aggregated to the following expression for the 
optimal km-tax: 
(A.22) *
P P P
C I
m m m      
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The optimal km-tax is expressed here by both a corrective component, 
P
C
m  and a 
“fiscal interaction” component 
P
I
m . We apply the definitions in (A.18) and (A.19) to 
the first part of the expression in (A.17) and get the following expression for the 
corrective component. 
(A.23)    ( )
P F P
C c nc nc c
m F F F m m m me e M e e e M         
This component accounts for traffic-related externalities from EVs, but also the 
impact the km-tax for EVs may have on externalities (through kilometers driven) 
from ICEVs. 
The remaining part of the expression in (A.17) is the fiscal interaction component. 
(A.24)
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This component represents interaction of EV-km tax with the broader fiscal system 
in the economy. The first, second and third terms denote how a change in 
Pm
  
affects tax revenue from ICEV km-tax, fossil fuel tax and electricity tax, respectively. 
The fourth and fifth terms denote how a change in 
Pm
  affects revenue from annual 
ownership and purchase taxes. The sixth term denotes how a change in 
Pm
  affects 
labor tax revenue. 
We proceed in this exercise by totally differentiating the terms in brackets in (A.24): 
(A.25) 
P P P
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m m L m
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(A.26) 
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(A.28) 
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(A.29) 
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(A.30)
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        
      
      
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Concerning the demand for vehicle kilometers, fossil fuels, electricity and car 
ownership, it is assumed that indirect changes in labor taxation (through the 
government budget constraint) have a small impact on corresponding demands 
relative to the direct impact of the km-tax. This is a reasonable approximation since 
Norwegian household income shares and income elasticities for operating costs and 
purchase costs for own car are relatively small (Boug & Dyvi, 2008). This means that 
the largest part of any compensation through revenue recycling will be spent on 
other goods. It is therefore reasonable to use uncompensated elasticities (see Willig, 
1976) in order to parameterize demand elasticities for vehicle kilometers, transport 
related energy and car ownership. The total differential of W wL  decomposes the 
change in labor income (labor supply) into three effects: The first component arises 
from the labor supply effect of raising the price of EV-kms relative to leisure which 
depends on the degree of substitution or complementarity between EV-kms and 
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leisure. The second term is the effect of revenue recycling, i.e. using EV-km tax 
revenues to reduce L  will increase labor supply. The third effect is the change in 
labor supply due to a change in commuting travel time caused by a EV-km tax 
induced change in vehicle kilometrage and, thus, congestion levels. 
Plugging Eq.(A.30) into 
PL m
d d   as displayed in Eq. (A.9) and grouping terms 
gives 
(A.31) 1
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L
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and 
(A.33) 2 L
L
L
B W w


 

  
The expression in (A.30) can be manipulated further by applying the following 
expression for the marginal cost of public funds: 
(A.34) (1 )
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This term reflects the marginal efficiency cost of raising public funds through taxing 
labor. On the flip side, it also reflects the marginal efficiency gain from cutting tax on 
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labor, which could be done by, e.g., raising funds from road pricing. The numerator 
in this expression represents the efficiency cost from an incremental increase in labor 
taxation, while the denominator gives us the marginal change in public revenue.  
0LL   represents the elasticity of labor supply (uncompensated). We have 0L   
as a consequence of 0LL   and (1 )1
L
L LL

  . The latter implies that L  is not so 
large that we find ourselves on the right side of the Laffer curve’s peak, meaning that 
government revenue from increasing labor taxation will, on the margin, be positive. 
We substitute 1 2PL md d B B     into Eq. (A.30), then plug the resulting 
expressions into Eq. (A.24), where we regroup terms and use the definition of 
L
 in 
Eq. (A.34). We then get: 
(A.35)
1
1
F
P P P P P
P
P
L
P P
F P F
m F P P F
m m m m m
I
m
P m
L
m m
dM dv dvdF dP
D D
d d d d d
dM dL L dt
w B
t d

  
    



 
 
    
 
         
     
  
Multiplying each term by 1
i mi
dM d  , and using the definitions of F  (Eq. (A.18)), F  
(Eq. (A.19)), P  (Eq. (A.20)) and F (Eq. (A.21)) gives 
(A.36) 
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The fiscal interaction component can be broken down into a revenue recycling 
component and a tax-interaction component. To obtain a clear expression for the 
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former, we need to manipulate Eq. (A.36). First, we obtain the following expressions 
from the own-price demand elasticity of EV-km: 
(A.37) 
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The term 
P
d
P P mR p c   is the private cost of a vehicle-km by electric car.  
We multiply the expression 1LB  by 
1
P mP
dM d and apply the definitions of F  (Eq. 
(A.18), F  (Eq. (A.19)), P  (Eq. (A.20)) and F (Eq. (A.21)), and we get: 
(A.38) 
 
1
1
1
L
P
P
P F
P
L
P P P
P m
d
P P m
m F m F F P
M
P P F F L
m m P m
B
dM d
R p c
p
L L dt
D D w
t d dM d




     

  
  
 

  
     
 
  
   
          
  
We can now define the following expression for the revenue recycling effect of the 
EV-km tax: 
(A.39) 
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We thus can rearrange Eq. (A.36) to: 
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From the Slutsky equation it follows that: 
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(A.41) 
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where superscript c indicates the compensated elasticity and L I   is the income 
effect on labor supply. From the Slutsky symmetry property and after some 
manipulation we get: 
(A.42) 
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c
MI  represents the income elasticity for vehicle kilometers (alternatively the 
compensated cross-price elasticity of leisure). LI  represents the income elasticity for 
labor.  
Plugging Eq. (A.42) into Eq. (A.40) and using Eq. (A.37) gives: 
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(A.43)
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The terms 
P
RR
m , P
TI
m and 
 
P
TI
m are the road price components for revenue recycling, 
tax interaction and pure tax interaction, respectively. 
Because '
m mP P
dt dM
d d
t   and M
L L
t R
 
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  with MR  as the full economic price (private 
cost) of vehicle kilometrage, we can write: 
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It follows from the Slutsky equation applied to the demand function that: 
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(A.45) 
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and from the Slutsky symmetry property for goods in the utility function: 
(A.46) (1 )
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where (1 ) cL Lw L     is the change in disposable income following a compensated 
increase in the labor tax. After some manipulation, we get: 
(A.47)
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Plugging Eq. (A.47) into Eq. (A.44) gives: 
(A.48)
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Substituting cLI LL LL    and   '
c
me M t M  and 
P
P
F m
F
P m
dM d
dM d



 , after 
regrouping terms we obtain the congestion feedback effect: 
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(A.49)
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We thus get the final expression for the optimal km-tax: 
(A.50) 
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It has the components: 
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(A.53)
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(A.54)  
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We solve the model in exactly the same way for *
Fm
 , and obtain analogous 
expressions that look like the following:  
(A.55) * ( )
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with the corrective component 
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, 
the tax interaction component (excluding the congestion feedback component)19  
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, 
and, finally, the congestion feedback component, 
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, 
The expressions for 
Fm
 mirror those for 
Pm
 . The parameters applied are given the 
same symbol, but with subscript F, and illustrate the mechanisms for the agents’ 
responses to a change in the tax on ICEV-kms.  
 
Appendix B. Deriving the welfare measure  
As can be seen in equation (A.16), we have the following marginal welfare effect of 
increasing the road price: 
                                                 
19 This expression has a term that is not present for determining road prices for EVs, namely 
Fm
F F
F mF
d f d
M
dM d



 . This term is related to induced changes in fuel efficiency. 
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The next step is to factor out 
P
P
m
dM
d
  and rearrange. This gives us: 
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Further rearranging gives: 
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Parts of this expression can be converted to the corrective component: 
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Other parts can be converted into the interaction component (see eq. (A.24)) 
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This gives us: 
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We numerically integrate this expression to find the change in welfare from a non-
marginal change in the km-tax. 
Appendix C. About the parameter values  
Some of the parameter values in Table 1 require further explanation. 
Initial vehicle kilometrage per car (EV & ICEV): Statistics Norway provides data of 
average kilometers driven annually per car on a municipal level. We aggregate these 
to averages on the analysis area level, large cities, small cities and rural areas, 
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according to definitions from Thune-Larsen et al. (2014). This report finds that 8% 
of vehicle kilometers driven in large cities are spent in congested peak traffic, which 
is used to divide between peak and off-peak kilometrage. 
Car ownership per household: Statistics Norway provides data on car ownership on a 
municipal level, and separates between ICEVs and EVs. We aggregate these to 
average car ownership per household on the analysis area level, large cities, small 
cities and rural areas, according to definitions from Thune-Larsen et al. (2014). These 
numbers are again weighted according to each area’s share of total households, so we 
get the weighted average car ownership per household. 
Average toll: Data on toll paid by passenger cars to toll companies have been 
provided by the National Public Road Administration’s toll statistics. Statistics on 
passenger car traffic volumes are given by Statistics Norway StatBank (2018d). Users 
pay per passing of tolling station, but the numbers have been normalized to per 
kilometer by dividing passenger car toll revenue by passenger car traffic volumes at 
county level. The national average was 0.31 NOK per km. The average tolls per 
kilometer for large cities, small cities and rural areas were then approximated by 
dividing toll revenue by traffic volumes for counties where these area types 
dominate. 
Purchase tax and VAT: The Norwegian Roads Federation (OVF) provides 
disaggregated car sales data from which the average price, purchase tax and VAT for 
the average ICEV can be calculated for any given year. 
Own-price elasticity of car kilometrage: The newest estimates of elasticity values for 
the National and Regional Transport Modeling system (NTM and RTM) in Norway 
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give an own price elasticity w.r.t. all kilometer costs and tolls together of -0.152 
(documented in Rekdal and Larsen (2008)). When putting this elasticity (adjusted for 
the ca. 40% fuel share of total kilometer costs and tolls) together with the own-price 
elasticity of fossil fuel intensity (i.e. the isolated elasticity component for fuel 
efficiency w.r.t. consumer fuel price), valuated at -0.092 (Norsk Petroleumsinstitutt, 
2011) we get the relatively more familiar own price elasticity for fuel. This sums up to 
-0.153. While this is lower than the elasticity for gasoline applied for the US in Parry 
and Small (2005) (-0.55) and Lin and Prince (2009) (-0.221) and the German case 
with Tscharaktschiew (2015), that totaled up to -0.5. Fridstrøm (2017) argues that car 
transport in Norway has a quite low price sensitivity on a national level because most 
Norwegians do not live in dense, urban areas with public transport as an alternative. 
In addition, Norwegians have for years gotten used to having both relatively high 
average incomes, and high costs of car transport.  
Cross-price elasticity of kilometer costs with respect to car ownership, i.e. how 
ownership of one car type increases when the kilometer costs of another increases. 
This is obtained by simulating the effect of increasing energy costs on new car sales 
in the BIG-model for the simulation year 2015, which then gives us a counterfactual 
change in the car stock. We extend this effect over 3 years and convert the implied 
elasticity measure for energy into an elasticity measure for kilometer costs. 
 
 
